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We consider the welfare effect of cross-border merger in presence of international
RDcompetition. Cross-border merger increases domestic welfare if the bargaining power of
the foreign firm and the slope of the marginal cost of RDare sufficiently low. Otherwise,
domestic welfare is lower under cross-border merger.
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A dominant form of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the advanced country and 
specially, in the US and Europe is mergers and acquisitions (M&A). As documented 
in JETRO (1996) and UNCTAD (1996), more than half of the foreign investment 
takes the form of M&A. As mentioned in Horn and Persson (2001), in 1994, more 
than 90% of the inward FDI in the US was in the form of M&A and the average over 
the period 1989 – 94 was 80%. Further, cross-border M&A in Western industrialized 
countries involving majority holdings were evaluated at 60% of total FDI. 
The dominant nature of cross-border M&A has attracted attention from the 
trade theorists (see, e.g., Barros and Cabral, 1994, Long and Vousden, 1995, Head 
and Ries, 1997, Roy et al., 1999, Das and Sengupta, 2001, Horn and Levinsohn, 2001, 
Horn and Persson, 2001 and Mattoo et al., 2004). Though the previous works have 
addressed several issues on cross-border mergers, one common feature of them, 
except Mattoo et al. (2004), is to ignore the effects of endogenous technology choice 
due to merger.      
This paper considers cross-border merger in presence of endogenous 
technology
1 choice and shows the effect on domestic welfare. We show that cross-
border merger increases domestic welfare if the bargaining power of the foreign firm 
and the slope of the marginal cost of R&D are sufficiently low. Otherwise domestic 
welfare is lower under cross-border merger. 
A recent paper by Mattoo et al. (2004) shows that cross-border merger 
increases domestic welfare if the slope of the marginal cost of R&D is sufficiently 
high. In our analysis, cross-border merger increases domestic welfare only if the slope 
of the marginal cost of R&D is sufficiently low.  
Though both the present paper and Mattoo et al. (2004) consider the effect of 
cross-border merger on welfare in presence of endogenous technology choice, it is 
important to note that the present paper differs from Mattoo et al. (2004) in two 
important ways. First, we consider R&D by both domestic and foreign firms, while 
only the foreign firm does R&D in Mattoo et al. (2004). Hence, Mattoo et al. (2004) 
is more relevant for merger between the firms from developing and developed 
countries with different R&D capabilities, while this paper is more appropriate for 
merger between the firms from developed countries with similar R&D capabilities. 
Second, we consider bargaining between the firms and show the role of bargaining 
power, whereas their focus is on the intensity of product market competition. Hence, 
the present paper complements Mattoo et al. (2004) and extends this line of research.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the model 
and derive the results in section 2. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Assume that there is a firm, firm 1, who wants to invest in a country, called domestic 
country. Firm 1 has to compete with a domestic firm, firm 2. Assume that the firms 
produce homogeneous products and the inverse market demand function is  
q a P − = ,                             (1)  
                                                      
1 We define the quality of technology by the marginal cost of production. Better technology implies 
lower marginal cost of production.  where the notations have usual meanings.  
Assume that the firms have similar technologies at the beginning and each 
firm has the constant average cost of production c. However, both firms do R&D to 
reduce their own cost of production. Assume that x amount of investment in R&D by 
firm  ,   reduces its cost of production to  i 2 , 1 = i ) (c i x − . For simplicity, we restrict 
our attention to the situation where  . However, R&D is costly and the cost 
function for R&D is 









= . We assume that there are no other costs associated 
with either R&D or production.  
We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm 1 decides whether to do FDI 
through direct entry or merger. If firm 1 does FDI through direct entry, both firms 
invest simultaneously in R&D at stage 2. Then, at stage 3, they compete like Cournot 
duopolists in the product market and the profits are realized. But, in case of merger at 
stage 1, firm 1 pays a transaction price,  , to firm 2 at stage 2. We assume that 
generalized Nash bargaining process determines the transaction price. At stage 3, firm 
1 decides its R&D investment. At stage 4, firm 1 chooses its output and the profit is 
realized. We solve the game through backward induction.  
F
 
2.1. Direct entry 
Given the R&D investments at stage 2, firms 1 and 2 choose outputs to maximize the 
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where   and   are the outputs of firms 1 and 2 respectively.  1 q 2 q
The equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 are respectively 
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The equilibrium net profits (i.e., profits excluding the R&D costs) of firms 1 and 2 are 
respectively 
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At stage 2, firms 1 and 2 maximize the following expressions respectively to 
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The equilibrium R&D investments are 
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Second order condition for maximization requires  τ <
9
8
 and we assume that it holds. 
Note that   (where  ) requires  c x
n





, and it is assumed to hold. 
  1Therefore, total R&D investment is 
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We find from (4) and (8) that the equilibrium outputs of firms 1 and 2 are  








n n .                         (10) 
Therefore, total output and consumer surplus are respectively 
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We find from (5) and (8) that the equilibrium net profits of firms 1 and 2 are  
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Under direct entry, domestic welfare (which is the sum of consumer surplus and net 
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2.2. Merger 
Now, consider the game under the history of merger at stage 1. 
Given the transaction price,  , and the R&D investment of firm 1, firm 1 
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The equilibrium output of firm 1 is 
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The equilibrium R&D investment is  
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Second order condition for maximization requires  τ <
2
1
 and this is satisfied since we 
have already assumed 
9
8
> τ . Further, the restriction   requires  c x
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Max > τ . 
  We get from (16) and (19) that total output and consumer surplus under 
merger are respectively 
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The industry profit is 
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2.2.1. Determination of the transaction price 
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where α  and  ) 1 ( α −  are the bargaining powers of firms 1 and 2 respectively, and 
] 1 , 0 [ ∈ α . The profits under direct entry are the reservation payoffs for the firms while 
bargaining for  .  F
  Maximizing (23), we get 
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2.3. Comparison between direct entry and merger 
Comparison of (8) and (19), and (9) and (19) give the following results immediately. 
 
Proposition 1: (i) Firm 1’s R&D investment is higher under merger than its own 
R&D investment under direct entry. 
(ii) Total R&D investment is higher under direct entry than merger. 
 
  Since quality of the technology under direct entry depends on the R&D 
investment of the individual firm, we have the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1: Relatively superior technology is always used under merger than direct 
entry. 
 
Merger increases concentration in the product market and, for a given R&D 
investment, it increases profit compared to direct entry. The higher profit under 
merger tends to increase R&D investment. On the other hand, there is a strategic 
effect under direct entry. If a firm invests more in R&D, its market share and profit 
  3increase. The strategic effect tends to increase R&D investment under direct entry. 
The effect of market concentration dominates the strategic effect of direct entry and 
generates higher R&D investment of firm 1 under merger than direct entry. However, 
total R&D investment is higher under direct entry than merger.  
Corollary 1 contrasts Mattoo et al. (2004), where the effect of merger on the 
quality of technology is ambiguous. 
It follows from (12), (21) and (24) that the net profits of both firms are higher 
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which holds for the relevant values of τ . Hence, the firms are better off under merger 
than direct entry, and merger occurs if it is not prevented by the domestic 
government. 
Unlike profits, comparison of (11) and (20) shows that consumer surplus is 
higher under direct entry than merger. Relatively superior technology is used under 
merger, which creates a positive impact on consumer surplus. But, merger increases 
market concentration, which creates a negative impact on consumer surplus. The 
market concentration effect dominates the technology effect and makes consumers 
worse-off under merger than direct entry.  
Hence, it is not clear a priori whether a welfare-maximizing domestic 
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, welfare of the domestic country is higher under 














Max τ . Otherwise, welfare of the domestic country is higher 
under direct entry. 
Proof: Comparing (14) and (27) we find that if  1 = α , (14) is always greater than 
(27). But, if  0 = α , we get that (27) is greater (less) than (14) if and only if 
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We find that 
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It follows from (24) and (27) that welfare of the domestic country under 
merger is continuous and negatively sloped in  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ α . Hence, welfare is greater 
under merger when α  and τ  are sufficiently low. Otherwise, (14) is greater than (27) 
and welfare is higher under direct entry.                      Q.E.D. 
    
In contrast to Mattoo et al. (2004), which shows that merger increases 
domestic welfare if the slope of the marginal cost of doing R&D is sufficiently high, 
the above result shows that domestic welfare is higher under merger only if  τ  is 
sufficiently low.  When τ  is low, it reduces the cost of R&D and therefore, increases 
R&D investment. Further, lower bargaining power of the foreign firm implies that 
most of the benefit from merger is extracted by the domestic firm, which raises 
domestic welfare. Combination of these effects creates higher domestic welfare under 
merger than direct entry. 
 
3. Conclusion 
We show that domestic welfare is higher under cross-border merger if bargaining 
power of the foreign firm and slope of the marginal cost of R&D are sufficiently low. 
Otherwise, domestic welfare is higher under direct entry. Our result is in contrast to 
the previous work where only the foreign firm does R&D. 
  Like Mattoo et al. (2004), we assume away uncertainty in R&D. Further, we 
have focused on non-cooperative R&D only, while the firms often do R&D 
cooperatively. These issues are in our future research agenda.  
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